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Case No. 20090882-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
vs. 
Charles Moa, 
Defendant/ Petitioner. 
Brief of Respondent 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This is a consolidated appeal from two separate cases. The case numbers are 
031903971 and 071904352. For convenience, the State will refer to them as case 3971 
and case 4352. The State will cite to the records as R. 3971 at and R. 4352 at . 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On August 27,2009, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its ruling in this case. 
That ruling is published as State v. Moa, 2009 UT App 231, 220 P.3d 162. 
(Addendum A). On January 28,2010, this Court granted Defendant's petition for a 
writ of certiorari. (Addendum B). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(a) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This Court granted review of two issues: 
1. "Whether the court of appeals erred in holding Petitioner failed to 
demonstrate plain error in the acceptance of his guilty plea as to district court case 
number 031903971." 
2. "Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's 
imposition of consecutive sentences." 
Standard of Review. "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals and not that of the district court. The court of appeals' decision is reviewed 
for correctness." State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, If 8, 147 P.3d 425 (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004), Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-
508 (West 2004), and Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-501 (West 2004) are included in 
Addendum C. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case 39711 
On April 4, 2003, Defendant and several friends approached a group of 
people in an Office Max parking lot, told them that the ''area was Glendale TCG 
(Tongan Crip Gang) territory/' pulled out handguns, and fired several shots at the 
group as they ran away. R. 3971 at 112:3. One witness later said that "the shooters 
appeared to be shooting randomly towards the crowd and towards the ground." R. 
3971 at 112: 3. Another witness told police that he heard approximately nine 
gunshots. R. 3971 at 112:3. A bullet struck one of the bystanders in the calf. R. 3971 
at 112: 3. Officers later learned that this victim had recently had problems with 
Defendant over a girl they both had dated. R. 3971 at 112: 3. 
Defendant was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, all second 
degree felonies. R. 3971 at 1-3. The information alleged that the crimes were subject 
to the gang enhancement in Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-203.1 (2003). R. 3971 at 1-
3. If convicted as charged, Defendant faced prison sentences of 5-to-life on each 
count. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (3)(d) (2003). 
1
 The underlying facts are taken from the PSI. R. 3971 at 112. Defendant did 
not challenge those facts at sentencing, R. 3971 at 234:29-30, and he has accordingly 
waived the opportunity to do so on appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6) (b) 
(West 2004); State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994). 
3 
After being booked into jail, Defendant fled the state. R. 3971 at 4,112: 4. 
During the next three years, Defendant was charged with assault in Washington in 
November 2003, obstruction of justice and vandalism in California in May 2005, 
assault in Washington in June 2005, and possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute in California in November 2006. R. 3971 at 112: 6-7. 
Defendant was eventually rearrested and brought to Utah to face his 
aggravated assault charges. R. 3971 at 112: 4. After Defendant's first two public 
defenders were conflicted out, attorney James Valdez entered a notice of 
appearance. R. 3971 at 41. Valdez negotiated a plea agreement with the State. R. 
3971 at 226: 5; 227: 11. Under its terms, Defendant agreed to plead no contest to 
discharging a firearm from a vehicle, a third degree felony under Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-10-508 (2003). In exchange, the State agreed to recommend a 
suspended sentence of 0-to-5 years in prison, and the State also agreed not to bring 
any additional charges stemming from this shooting. R. 3971 at 227: 4,12. 
Valdez filled out a plea affidavit in anticipation of the plea hearing. R. 3971 at 
75-82; see also R. 3971 at 227: 10-11, 15. Before that hearing was held, however, 
Defendant wrote a letter to the court asking for new counsel. R. 3971 at 59-61. 
Valdez then filed a motion to withdraw, and on April 24, 2007, Manny Garcia 
appeared as successor counsel. R. 3971 at 55, 63. After entering his appearance, 
4 
'Garcia reviewed the plea affidavit and discussed it with Valdez, R. 3971 at 227:12, 
-Garcia then met with Defendant, "specifically addressing Ine charge of ai^narging 
a firearm, R. 5LK I alAAr, L"1, 
I'olkHA tny} ihat discussion, Dt'lcndant again iii^renl in ,iriv|i"t iln« IIIMI IIIIMII 
thore \\ i*s a probli TH niie n>f Defendant's accomplices in this crime had accepted the 
same deal earlier and had already been released from jail. R. 3971 at 227:12-14,17, 
Defendant had been arrested 21 days after his accomplice, however, and had thus 
served less time in jail As a result, the prosecutor insisted u uiLnt! *\ *..-uju itK)L acrree 
. . / T V . n •• - ~ " - - - • ; 7 . 
r>tend ant's grandfather was ill at the time, and it was very important to him 
that hp eet out of jail that day, rather than serving three more weeks in jail R. 3971 
at 11 2: 4, Defendant accordingly asked Garcia to renegotiate the plea deal to secure 
nib imiiiedidte itrjds^. K. . - . i ... .~ . : i -, ./efenaaru s request, Garcia 
negot»..:Ljaci:i c.;.:- ... -d dbreein-id .. - * r i i-.;--* de :v, •m:n.T,>»d >::- :- j^ * 
, v .,- -, d ~n . . ... - . - . „ = v , ,r;> l(J 3.^0-5 years, and Defendant agreed to delay 
the sentencing hearing while a PSI was prepared; in exchange, the State agreed that 
Defendant could be released from jail that day, rather than serving an additional 21 
5 
days in jail. R. 3971 at 227: 12-14. After Garcia discussed these alterations with 
Defendant, Defendant agreed to the amended deal. R. 3971 at 227:13-14.2 
On May 25, 2007, Defendant appeared in court to enter his plea. R. 3971 at 
226:1-15. The parties first confirmed that Defendant was pleading no contest to a 
third degree felony of unlawfully discharging a firearm, specifically identifying 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-508 as the charge. R. 3971 at 226:1-2, 5, 8. 
The discussion then turned to the specific variant of the crime at issue. When 
a person unlawfully discharges a firearm, the crime is ordinarily a class B 
misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(1). But if the crime occurs under one 
of the three circumstances set forth in § 76-10-508(2)(a) to -(c), it becomes a third 
degree felony. Here, the parties informed the court that Defendant's plea was to a 
third degree felony because he was admitting to having fired shots "toward a 
building." R. 3971 at 226: 2, 6. The "toward a building" variant of this crime is set 
2
 The change in the recommended suspended sentence appears to have also 
been an effort to correct an error in the original agreement. Specifically, while a 
third degree felony ordinarily carries a prison sentence of 0-5 years, unlawfully 
discharging a firearm requires a minimum of three years in prison. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (2003); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2) (2003). Thus, the original 
agreement was incorrect when it called for a suspended sentence of 0-to-5 years, 
rather than 3-to-5 years. The prosecutor recognized this before the change in plea, 
and he accordingly requested that this change be set forth in the amended 
agreement. See R. 3971 at 226: 9; 3971 at 227:15. 
6 
forth n; L tan Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b), and occurs when "the actor, with intent 
to intimidate or harass another, or \\ !th intent I? J.r:^aeo a habitable stru.ctu.xe 
discharges a firearm, i.-; .ne uucaiuii ^; an\ o^d ing . . ..lis case, the parties 
/ : ^ v - n - ' - p ! : - c v ' v . ' ' '" - n - ' - . " - ^ ^ <* : ^ : t r i—ar t i e sd idno t 
refer to the specific requirement that the crime occur with an intent to "intimidate or 
harass another, or with intent to damage a. habitable structure/' 
The trial court then conducted a rule 11 colloauv with DereiiuanL di iri v\ r\u h 
it askea JJclcnvtaitL ,i IK ;,„.. .-,nv questions. :i. - : . : „ - . i. : .. .: . .• 
: ^ C L . - . --- - • * •* -it t :) t hos<* - * . ;•• J * r-* -*"•' ' 
: -'"d - ' • -• •' - ; -1 scented his plea. R. 3971 at 75-82; 3971 at 22o. i l . 
One week after the plea hearing, the State filed charges against Defendant for 
witness tampering stemming from his conduct during a pretrial hearing in case 
3971. : \ . . ; ^ i u i . •< -..I ' . ^ ' J a ICJ ia ie aisu iueu uiarges against Defendant 
for his participatioi i in tl i..e di i ve-by shooting at issue incase 435.2 R 4.35,2 at 2 5».J 
1
 "Ver \hj course o! the nr^ t month, 1 Meiidani UTOIP t our pro se letters to the 
court asking for leave to withdraw his plea in case 3971. R. 3971 at 101. In his 
J
 The facts surrounding case 4352 are set forth in more detail below, 
7 
letters, Defendant offered two reasons for withdrawing his plea. R. 3971 at 101-09. 
First, he claimed that the State had violated the plea agreement by filing the witness 
tampering charge; and second, Defendant claimed that he had not approved the 
alterations to the plea agreement that resulted in his immediate release from jail. R. 
3971 at 101-09. Defendant did not mention any concern with rule 11 in any of those 
letters, nor did he ever express confusion over the elements of the crime to which he 
had pleaded. R. 3971 at 101-09.4 
Garcia subsequently filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. R. 3971 at 107-08. 
Robin Ljunberg then appeared as counsel and filed a motion to withdraw 
Defendant's plea. R. 3971 at 124-28. In that motion, Defendant again claimed that 
his plea was invalid because of the alterations to the plea and the witness tampering 
charge. R. 3971 at 127-28. As in the pro se letters, Defendant did not express any 
concern over rule 11 or the elements of the charge. R. 3971 at 127-28. 
Although the State did not concede that the witness tampering charge had 
actually violated the plea agreement, the State ultimately agreed to drop the charge. 
R. 3971 at 140; 227: 6-7; 234: 20. 
4
 Defendant later offered an additional reason when speaking with the PSI 
investigator, telling him that "he is going to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial 
because he believes he can beat this case." R. 3971 at 112: 4. 
8 
On October 5, 20C7, the trial court held a hearing on Defendant's motion to 
withdraw his -*•• 7 3971 at 77" 1 ? ' M the outset Defendant personally 
addressed the court and repeated ;.L- claim L.^ . ~u lie: .,; j . ; ^ 
alterations to UTJ :TJC;.;U;:C'J;. •.* .. • • - , . ; : .is Icmiperingcharee Iia J nolatod 
:-., j.t;3v-_" - ^ - • ' ^ c ^ v . -ir'.c^7 then repeated those 
arguments in his own remarks. When asked about the witness tampering charge, 
however, defense counsel admitted that those charges had already been dismissed 
and were not a basis for withdrawing the plea. R. 3971 at 227; 6. 
Beforebeginniiigner-UL^Ur^iveresponse, m^ prosec*. ~i :L:\-- . i::r. • 
Defendai itw as"i tot •u;k.,.,i %.r ;., . . • . •*•: r / - \ . • ' l , 
1! 1 ill he - -'-••-•«ely gOLpv ^ - • ? • niea wa=> char -ed." R. 3971 at 227: 7. 
Defense counsel responded; ""That's correct, your Honor. That was never an 
allegation that Mr. Moa made to nv." K - H ! 227- " " m i - . e d on" that 
stipulation, the prosecutor called Garcia to the stand and questioned turn about d :e 
sole claim still at issue; whether Deiei tdai n had iippi oved the alterations to the pled 
In his testimony, Garcia testified that he had discussed the original agreement 
with Defendant before the plea hearing, "specifically addressing the charge of 
discharging a firearm " R. 3971 at 227:1 2. Garcia then explained that Defendant 
9 
had "attempted] to change" the original agreement because he "wanted to get out 
of jail that day." R. 3971 at 227:12-13. According to Garcia, Defendant's desire to be 
released that day was "the only reason this changed." R. 3971 at 227:17. 
Following this testimony, the attorneys argued the merits of the motion. The 
prosecutor argued that because Defendant had stipulated that there had been no 
rule 11 violation, the court should enforce the resulting presumption that the plea 
was knowing and voluntary. R. 3971 at 227:18. In response, defense counsel again 
confirmed that Defendant was not arguing that rule 11 had been violated. R. 3971 at 
227:19. Specifically, counsel again acknowledged that "Mr. Moa has never alleged 
that you didn't follow Rule 11 in this case." R. 3971 at 227: 19. Instead, counsel 
argued that withdrawal was appropriate because Moa had not approved the 
changes to the plea agreement. R. 3971 at 227:19. 
The court subsequently entered a written finding that the parties had 
"stipulated that the plea... was taken in compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure." R. 3971 at 195. The court also concluded that as a matter of 
law, Defendant's plea was "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made." R. 
3971 at 196. The court accordingly denied Defendant's motion. R. 3971 at 195-97. 
10 
Case43525 
After being released from ir:1 ;~ case ,.:•-, i ,-.,• -jiore sentencing :..-.„ 
occurred, Uerendant was involved inanothe: >;' ..: ,. ;. 1 Vferulinl Jn ' r 
began ^ho<>tin<; H* I hnmc Tv 4352 at PSI: 3. Officers later found several bullet holes 
in a vehicle that was parked outside that home. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4, 
Two citizens saw the shooting, and one of them followed Defendant as he left 
the neighborhood. R. 4352 at PSI: \ bsequently joined the pursu,. 
4352 at PSI: A . jiendar.t; J : ^ .. » •:• . . •_. , _ ^.v-
b j . ^ . . u y . M . - , v ; : - / ' ' ' * x —>^nc;.
 3 > During 'he 
i l i ^ D>-'^ ndr--v Intentionally crashed head-on into one of the patrol vehicles and 
sped w! w?y. R. 4352 at PSI: 3. Officers eventually forced Defendant off the road by 
using the "pit maneuver." R. 4352 at PSI: 3.6 
5
 The PSI in case 4352 is located in a non-paginated manila folder. As with the 
PSI in case 3971, Defendant did not challenge the accuracy of the facts contained in 
this PSI before sentencing, and those facts are accordingly accepted as true. The 
State will cite to it as R. 4352 at PSI: _ . 
* ' A pit maneuver "is a method used by police to force a pursued vehicle to 
abruptly turn sideways to the direction of 'travel, by bumping the back side of 
the pursued vehicle with the police vehicle, causing the fleeing driver to lose 
control and stop. 'PIT' stands for either 'Precision Immobilization Technique/ 
'Pursuit Intervention Technique,'" or 'Parallel Immobilization Technique/ 
11 
After his vehicle was stopped, Defendant fled on foot. R. 4352 at PSI: 4. 
Defendant ignored officers' commands to stop, and officers had to taser him twice 
before they were able to subdue and arrest him. R. 4352 at PSI: 4. 
Defendant was charged with seven counts of discharging a firearm from a 
vehicle, one count of aggravated assault, one count of failing to respond to an 
officer's commands, and one count of failing to stop at an officer's command. R. 
4352 at 2-5. On November 13, 2007, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of 
discharging a firearm from a vehicle, one count of aggravated assault, and one count 
of failing to stop at an officer's command. R. 4352 at 73-74. 
Defendant was sentenced on January 11,2008. R. 4352 at 122:1-7. During the 
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor offered "to give a little bit of background as to 
what occurred at this home." R. 4352 at 122:5. The prosecutor explained that there 
had been a shooting at the same home earlier in the year in which a young girl had 
been hit. R. 4352 at 122: 5. The prosecutor further explained that "[t]here's not just 
one victim in this case. This is a whole neighborhood who had multiple shootings, 
and finally got Mr. Moa because the citizens were willing to step up and put their 
own lives in danger." R. 4352 at 122: 6. After relating the facts of the shooting at 
depending on the police department using it." United States v. Bazaldua, 506 F.3d 
671, 673 n.2 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 
12 
issue here, the prosecutor argued that Defendant is "extremely dangerous." R. 4°" n 
at 122: 6, Defendant did not object to anv of these statements. 
The coun jicn sentenced uduiiwu..; :o pi^u.;, . : JLI.IIU . . . • - ..i- . 
wouic neconse^u:. —':-*.- *"'!- * "'••'*' " 
nugr/ •'' -'' I r' • • -\4 -v>i refer to the prosecutor's comments 
when explaining its sentence. Instead, the court simply stated that consecutive 
sentences were appropriate because Defendant is' "an extreme danger to any 
community that he happens to be in." R 4352 at 12.. >. 
•-^•; * ' .ippeak-d ;:v: •• - J ' > r •' '-. : ~'V~ '" \ i r ,>( \r>r>eals. 
See-v-- -":/ ^.— - A ioa, 2009 UT A — 231, 220 P.3d lc2. 
In case 3971, Defendant argued that the triaK^urt violated ru'e 11 hv failing 
to ensure that he understood all of the elements before accepting his plea, J d. at 
f 13. According to Defendant, he was not informed that one ul the elements J1 
or harass another." U1, M %]\ 10, 15-16. Defendant acknowledged that this claim was 
unpreserved, but argued that the violation was plain error. Id. at % 1 3. 
The court of appeals agreed with Defendant that the trial court had obviously 
erred in accepting his plea. Specifically, the court noted tl tat the ' £ nil elements of 
13 
the third-degree felony to which Moa was pleading were not referenced or clarified 
anywhere in the colloquy or plea statement/' and it accordingly concluded that 
Defendant's plea was unknowing and involuntary. Id. at %f 14-15. But the court of 
appeals then concluded that Defendant had not shown that this error "actually 
affected the outcome of the plea process." Id. at ^ 17. As a result, the court rejected 
his plain error claim. Id. 
In case 4352, Defendant argued that the trial court had considered several 
allegedly inappropriate comments from the prosecutor as part of its decision to 
order consecutive sentences. Id. The court of appeals rejected this argument, 
concluding that Defendant had failed to show that the trial court had actually relied 
on those statements. Id. at f^ 20. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: First, this Court should decline Defendant's request to review the 
alleged rule 11 violation because Defendant expressly stipulated that there had been 
no rule 11 error during the proceedings below. As a result of this stipulation, 
Defendant's rule 11 claim is barred by the invited error doctrine. In any event, even 
if this claim were properly before this Court, Defendant's claim fails. Settled 
precedent establishes that rule 11 compliance is not constitutionally required. Thus, 
the alleged rule 11 violation did not obviously render his plea unconstitutional. 
14 
Second, Defendant has not shown that his plea w as obviously unknowing or 
involuntary. As a result of Defendant's rule 11 stipulation, this Court must presume 
that Defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary Undti bettlnJ Unikil SLih i 
Supreme Court precedent,, llJIhr- < mill III.J\ 111« «» i iiesun > that it h asl onv nt 
Defendant'c ' ^  > »homeys informed 1 iim i »f the elements of the crime during their 
-; - ~:<r•$ discussions. Moreover, Defendant was repeatedly informed of the specific 
subsection at issue, and his counsel later testified that he had specifically discussed 
the "charge" with Defendant. The trial court therefore did not obviously err when it 
accepted his plea. 
:„I^L>,J\\ * " o . •. .. ' '-1* DIM i s h o u l d aff i rm 111*11 oui ' l ut 
,xypcc\- v • ' i was not ""ejudicial. To show prejudice, 
Defendant must show that he would not have entered this plea but for the alleged 
error. But in this case, the record shows that Defendant accepted the plea agreement 
because it allowed him to escape three potential life sentences and be released fi om 
j a A in a t a a y. A . mough D t:: -a; ; U ^ ;;; ^ ggests that 1 le \ voi lid not have admitted to 
trying to intimidate someone, the record does not support 'this claim. Instead, that 
claim is directly contracted by Defendant's admissions in this case, as well as his 
extensive history of violent behavior. 
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Point II: The court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it ordered consecutive sentences in case 4352. Defendant 
not only pleaded guilty to being the driver in a residential shooting, but also to 
committing aggravated assault against a police officer who was involved in the 
subsequent pursuit. When coupled with Defendant's extensive criminal history, the 
trial court justifiably concluded that Defendant is a danger to the community. As a 
result, the court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered consecutive sentences. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE BARS DEFENDANTS 
PLAIN ERROR CLAIM IN CASE 3971. EVEN IF REACHED, 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS NO PLAIN ERROR, 
To show plain error, Defendant must demonstrate that (1) an error occurred 
which "should have been obvious to the trial court/' and (2) that "the error was 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
In his brief, Defendant argues that the trial court violated rule 11 when it 
accepted his plea, and he then claims that this error rendered his plea unknowing 
and involuntary. Pet. Br. 14. This Court should not consider Defendant's rule 11 
claim, however, because Defendant invited any error when he stipulated that there 
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had been no rule 11 violation during the proceedings below. In addition, any error 
did not obviously render his plea unconstitutional, given that rule 11 compliance is 
not constitutionally required. 
With respect to the underlying issue of whether Defendant's plea was 
unknowing or involuntary, the court of appeals was incorrect when it concluded 
that Defendant obviously did not understand the elements of the crime prior to 
entering his plea. But even if there were obvious error, the court of appeals 
correctly rejected Defendant's claim because Defendant has not shown prejudice. 
A. This Court should not consider Defendant's rule 11 claim because 
he invited any error. In any event, any alleged rule 11 error did not 
obviously render Defendant's plea unconstitutional.7 
Defendant argues that the Constitution requires trial courts to "ensure that 
pleas are knowing and voluntary" by "strictly comply[ing] with rule 11/' Pet. Br. 
14. He then argues that because the trial court did not comply with rule 11 when it 
took his plea, his plea was unconstitutional. Id. This Court should reject this claim. 
7
 In its brief to the court of appeals, the State argued that Defendant's rule 11 
claim was barred by the doctrine of invited error. See generally Aplee. Br. 22-25. The 
court of appeals did not address this argument in its opinion. See generally Moa, 
2009 UT App 231, I f 5-17. But it is well-settled that this Court can affirm a decision 
below on any ground that is apparent on the record. See Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 
28, \ 13, 234 P.3d 1100; Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995). 
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1. Defendant's rule 11 claim is barred by the invited error 
doctrine. 
"Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made [at trial] in 
order to preserve an issue for appeal/' State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 45,114 P.3d 551. 
Absent such an objection, this Court reviews an unpreserved claim only if the party 
" articulate[s] an appropriate justification for appellate review/7 such as plain error 
or exceptional circumstances. Id. "But under the doctrine of invited error," this 
Court declines "to engage in even plain error review when counsel, either by 
statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she had no 
objection." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 14,128 P.3d 1171 (quotations and citation 
omitted). This "arises from the principle that a party cannot take advantage of an 
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the 
error." Id. at f^ 15. It also "discourage[es] parties from intentionally misleading the 
trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Id. Thus, 
where counsel "confirm[s] on the record that the defense had no objection" or 
"fail[s] to object . . . when specifically queried by the court," the invited error 
doctrine bars plain error review. State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,110,86 P.3d 742. 
Here, Defendant repeatedly waived any rule 11 claim during the proceedings 
below. At the hearing on his motion to withdraw, his counsel twice informed the 
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court that Defendant had "never" claimed that there had been a rule 11 violation. R. 
3971 at 227: 7, 19. In accordance with this, his counsel expressly limited his 
argument to the allegation that the plea alterations had rendered the plea invalid. R. 
3971 at 227:19. Based on Defendant's representations, the trial court later found 
that Defendant had "stipulated that the plea . . . was taken in compliance with Rule 
11." R. 3971 at 195. 
Defendant's rule 11 stipulation dramatically altered the ability of the State to 
respond to this claim. As noted, Manny Garcia — the attorney who had represented 
Defendant during the final plea negotiations — testified at the evidentiary hearing. 
At the outset of her examination of Garcia, the prosecutor confirmed that there was 
no rule 11 challenge. As a result of Defendant's rule 11 stipulation, the prosecutor 
limited her questioning to the issue of the plea alterations, rather than an addressing 
any issues regarding Defendant's understanding of the rights covered in rule 11. 
See generally R. 3971 at 227: 10-20. Had Defendant raised his rule 11 claim at that 
time, the prosecutor could have created a record about those issues, such as by 
asking Garcia to describe his conversations with Defendant regarding the elements 
of the amended charge. But, as a direct result of Defendant's stipulation, those 
questions were never asked. 
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In short, Defendant's unpreserved claim ultimately relies on an evidentiary 
gap that he created. The invited error doctrine therefore precludes review of 
Defendant's rule 11 claim. 
2. Rule 11 is a rule of procedure, not constitutional law. As a 
result, a rule 11 violation does not obviously render a plea 
unconstitutional. 
Even if reached, however, the alleged rule 11 violation did not obviously 
render Defendant's plea unconstitutional. 
In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 461-62 (1969), the United States 
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether compliance with rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is constitutionally required. The Court first 
explained that due process requires that a plea be knowing and voluntary. Id. at 
465-66. But while the Court acknowledged that rule 11 is "designed to assist the 
district judge in making" that determination, the Court refused to hold that rule 11 
compliance is, itself, "constitutionally mandated." Id. 
The Court reaffirmed this holding later that same term in Halliday v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969). The Court explained that it had taken "care [mMcCarthy] 
to note that our holding was based solely upon the application of Rule 11 and not 
upon constitutional grounds." Id. at 832. The Court thus noted that a "large 
number of constitutionally valid convictions . . . may have been obtained without 
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full compliance with Rule 11." Id. at 833. Ten years later, the Court reemphasized 
that "a violation" of rule 11 is "neither constitutional nor jurisdictional." United 
States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783-84 (1979). 
The reason for this distinction is, in part, structural. Unlike the Constitution, 
rules of procedure are subject to routine alteration. Utah's rule 11, for example, has 
been amended eight times since 1993. See Utah R. Crim. Proc. 11, adv. cmte. notes. 
But routine alterations to a rule of procedure are not binding as a matter of 
constitutional law. In United States v. Mercado, 349 F.3d 708, 710 (2d Cir. 2003), for 
example, the Second Circuit accordingly rejected a claim that rule 11 violations are 
considered to be constitutional violations, explaining that "changes to the Rule do 
not create new constitutional rights." 
In Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988 (Utah 1993), this Court similarly recognized 
that rule 11 compliance is not constitutionally mandated. In that case, Salazar had 
pleaded guilty to murder. Id. at 989. After he failed to file a timely motion to 
withdraw his plea, he sought post-conviction relief, claiming that the plea was 
unconstitutional because of a rule 11 violation. Id. at 989-90. This Court rejected 
that claim, concluding that while there might have been a rule 11 violation, there 
had not been a constitutional violation. Id. at 991-93. Relying in part on McCarthy, 
this Court explained that there is a difference between the constitutional standard 
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and rule l l ' s requirements. Id. at 991. Thus, while rule 11 is designed to "protect 
the [ ] rights" that are set forth in the Constitution, "a failure to comply with Utah's 
rule 11 in taking a guilty plea does not in itself amount to a violation of a 
defendant's rights under either the Utah or the United States Constitution." Id. 
This Court recently reaffirmed that distinction in Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT 90, 
If 19, 173 P.3d 842. There, this Court held that a post-conviction petitioner was 
required to "establish not just that the trial court violated rule 11," but also that "she 
did not, in fact, enter her pleas in a knowing and voluntary way." And in State v. 
Visser, 2001 UT App 215,117,31 P,3d 584, the court of appeals likewise explained 
that the defendant's rule 11 claim was "distinct" from his "due process claim that 
the plea was not knowing and voluntary." 
In short, the "prophylactic provisions of rule 11" are designed to ensure that 
a defendant's constitutional rights are protected, but those provisions are not 
constitutional rules in and of themselves. Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992. Instead, the 
Constitution requires only that a plea be knowing and voluntary. Id. Defendant is 
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therefore incorrect when he claims that the trial court violated his constitutional 
rights by failing to comply with rule l l .8 
In response, Defendant suggests that a rule 11 violation provides a basis for 
withdrawing a plea under State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (1987), and its progeny. 
Pet. Br. 28-29. Defendant is incorrect. 
In Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-14, this Court held that trial courts must comply 
with rule 11 before accepting a plea. Relying on Gibbons, subsequent Utah decisions 
held that a defendant can withdraw a guilty plea if the trial court did not strictly 
comply with rule 11. See, e.g., State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f f 14-19,114 P.3d 569; 
State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12,1f| 21-25,26 P.3d 203; State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, H 1 0 -
12, 22 P.3d 1242; State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 821-22 (Utah App. 1995). 
As noted above, however, the United States Supreme Court and this Court 
have both repeatedly held that rule 11 compliance is not constitutionally required. 
* In State v. Lovell, 2010 UT 48, f f 42,69,70,78,81,661 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, this 
Court suggested in dicta that a rule 11(e) violation renders a plea unknowing and 
involuntary. This dicta, in effect, equates the constitutional and rule 11 standards. 
But Lovell did not suggest that it intended to depart from this Court's contrary 
holdings in Salazar and Bluemel Indeed, in a footnote, Lovell, expressly stated that it 
was not resolving whether the knowing and voluntary standard in the plea 
withdrawal statute was the same standard as the prior good cause provision. Id. 
f 47 n.5. On August 23, 2010, the State filed a petition for rehearing asking the 
Court to remove the dicta equating the two standards. That petition is still pending. 
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This Court has since specifically stated that Gibbons did not set forth a constitutional 
requirement. See Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992. To the contrary, this Court has recognized 
that the "right to seek withdrawal of a guilty plea" is "a right without express 
constitutional protection" that is only "granted by statute." State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 
34,t125 /45 /114P.3d585. 
When properly viewed as a statutorily-based decision, Defendant's reliance 
on Gibbons and its progeny is unavailing. And the reason for this is that the plea 
withdrawal statute has been substantively modified since Gibbons was issued. 
The statutory standard for withdrawing a plea is set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated § 7743-6 (West 2004). Prior to 2003, this statute allowed a defendant to 
withdraw a plea for "good cause." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004), 
Historical and Statutory Notes. Utah courts had historically interpreted this 
standard to include rule 11 violations. See, e.g., State v. Penman, 964 P2d 1157,1160 
(Utah App. 1998); State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 821-22 (Utah App. 1995); State v. 
Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 n.l (Utah App. 1994). 
In 2003, however, the Utah Legislature removed the "good cause" provision 
from § 77-13-6 and replaced it with the constitutional standard. Specifically, the 
statute was rewritten to state that a plea can be withdrawn "only upon leave of the 
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code 
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Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004) (emphasis added). The 2003 amendment thus expressly 
incorporated the constitutional standard —i.e. the knowing and voluntary 
standard — as the sole basis for withdrawing a plea. This is significant, given that a 
rule 11 violation does not render a plea unknowing or involuntary. See Salazar, 852 
P.2d at 992 (explaining that the knowing and voluntary standard is "more limited 
[in] scope" that rule 11). 
Importantly, the legislative history behind the 2003 amendment shows that 
the Legislature specifically intended to remove rule 11 as a basis for withdrawing a 
plea. When the bill was introduced to the Utah House of Representatives, its 
sponsor explained that 
[t]he current statute permits the withdrawal of a guilty plea only upon 
good cause shown... . What the constitution requires is that the plea 
be made knowingly and voluntarily, and rule 11 should actually create 
a safe harbor and not be the standard by which withdrawal is 
determined. [H.B.] 238 would correct some problems by permitting 
defendants to withdraw their pleas only on a showing that the plea 
was not knowing and voluntary. 
Representative Katherine Bryson, Floor Debate on H.B. 238,2003 Utah Legislature, 
February 28, 2003, audio file located at http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/ 
index.asp?House=H. 
When the bill was introduced to the Senate, its Senate sponsor specifically 
explained that the amendment was intended to ensure that rule 11 could no longer 
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serve as the basis for withdrawing a plea. According to its sponsor, rule 11 requires 
a judge to "recite all of the rights that a defendant would give up if the defendant 
were to plead guilty," but "the only thing the constitution requires is that a plea be 
made knowingly and voluntarily. Hence, the statute itself will be changed to 
simply show that the court may allow a defendant to withdraw his or her plea upon 
a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Senator David 
Gladwell, Floor Debate on H.B. 238,2003 Utah Legislature, March 4,2003, audio file 
located at http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?House=S.9 
* * * * * 
In short, the United States Supreme Court and this Court have both expressly 
held that rule 11 violations are not constitutional violations. And although older 
versions of the plea withdrawal statute allowed for withdrawal based on a rule 11 
violations, the statute that was in effect at the time of this plea did not. Instead, 
under the law that was in effect at the time of Defendant's plea, he could only 
withdraw a guilty plea by showing that the plea was unknowing or involuntary. 
9
 Significantly, this amendment passed both houses unanimously—with votes 
of 63-0-12 in the House of Representatives, and 27-0-2 in the Senate. See 
http://le.utah.gov/~2003/status/hbillsta/hb0238.htm. 
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Defendant therefore cannot show that there was an obvious error based on any 
violation of rule 11. Defendant's rule 11 claim accordingly fails. 
B. The record does not support Defendant's claim that he obviously 
did not know the elements of the crime at issue. 
Although primarily basing his argument on the alleged rule 11 violation, 
Defendant also argues that his plea was also unknowing and involuntary. This 
claim is unpreserved, however, so Defendant again argues plain error. On appeal 
below, the court of appeals agreed with Defendant, concluding that the plea was 
obviously unknowing and involuntary because Defendant was not informed that 
the unlawfully discharging a firearm from a vehicle includes, as an element, the 
"intent to intimidate or harass another." Moa, 2009 UT App 231, ^  13-15. This 
Court should overturn that conclusion. 
As noted, this claim only succeeds if the alleged error "should have been 
obvious to the trial court." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. When considering this claim, 
the court "is not limited to the record of the plea hearing but may look at the 
surrounding facts and circumstances, including the information the petitioner 
received from his or her attorneys before entering the plea/' Salazar, 852 P.2d at 993; 
accord Visser, 2000 UT 88,112; Jolivet v. Cook 784 P.2d 1148,1150 (Utah 1989). 
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As noted above, the knowing and voluntary standard requires that a plea be 
knowing and voluntary. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 465-66. Under this standard, a 
defendant must be informed of the elements of the crime prior to entering his plea; 
but this particular requirement can be satisfied when a defendant is informed of the 
elements by his attorney, even if that occurs privately. In Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 
U.S. 175,183 (2005), for example, the Supreme Court stressed that it has "never held 
that the judge must himself explain the elements of each charge to the defendant on 
the record. Rather, the constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied 
where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of 
the crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel/' In 
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976), the Court similarly held that the 
elements requirement can be satisfied through "either an explanation of the charge 
by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of 
the offense has been explained to the accused." 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has also held that even when defense counsel 
has not made "an express representation" that he explained the elements to the 
defendant, it still "may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense 
counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the 
accused notice of what he is being asked to admit." Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647. 
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Thus, where "a defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court usually 
may rely on that counsel's assurance that the defendant has been properly informed 
of the nature and elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty." Bradshaw, 
545 U.S. at 183. In addition, this Court has also held that if a trial court engages in a 
rule 11 colloquy, that creates a presumption that the plea was knowing and 
voluntary as well. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT12, % 22,26 P.3d 203; State v. Gamblin, 
2000 UT 44,111,1 P.3d 1108. 
In this case, the plea colloquy and affidavit alone show that Defendant was 
informed of all of the elements of the crime except one. Specifically, Defendant was 
informed that he was pleading to having discharged a firearm within 600 feet of a 
building, which satisfied the core requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-
508(l)(a)(vii)(A), and also that he was admitting that he had fired shots "toward a 
building," an apparent reference to the third degree felony enhancement set forth in 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-508(2)(b). See R. 3971 at 76; 226: 2,4-6. 
But the plea colloquy and affidavit do not explicitly state that Defendant acted 
"with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable 
structure." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). As noted, this omission provides the 
basis for Defendant's claim. But to show obvious error, Defendant must 
demonstrate that the record as a whole demonstrates that he was unaware of this 
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element before pleading. Contrary to the court of appeals7 conclusion, the record as 
a whole actually demonstrates that Defendant was aware of this element on at least 
five different levels. 
First, Defendant was represented by counsel throughout this process — 
initially by James Valdez, who negotiated the original deal, and then by Manny 
Garcia, who negotiated the amended deal. As a result, this Court can "presume" 
that Valdez, Garcia, or both "explained] the nature of the offense in sufficient detail 
to give [Defendant] notice of what he [was] being asked to admit." Henderson, 426 
U.S. at 647; accord Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 183. 
Second, Defendant repeatedly stipulated that there was no rule 11 error when 
the issue was raised below. R. 3971 at 227: 7, 19. As a result of this stipulation, this 
Court can presume that the plea was knowing and voluntary. Martinez, 2001UT12, 
\ 22; Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, | 11. This is particularly true given the unique 
circumstances at issue here, where Defendant was represented by counsel during a 
plea withdrawal process, and where counsel then affirmatively stipulated that 
Defendant was not claiming that there had been any rule 11 error. R. 3971 at 227: 7, 
19. In a very real sense, this stipulation suggested that Defendant had understood 
all of the rights set forth in rule 11 — which necessarily included the elements of the 
crime. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A). 
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Third, the record also shows that Defendant was informed of the specific 
statute at issue—both in terms of its general code number, R. 3971 at 75-76; 3971 at 
226: 6, as well as the specific variant at issue in this plea. R. 3971 at 226: 2. When 
considering a similar claim, the Seventh Circuit has suggested that this puts a 
defendant on notice of the elements of the crime. See United States v. Franklin, 547 
F.3d 726, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) ("the citation to the statute. . . should have informed 
Franklin about the elements of the crime to which he was pleading guilty"). 
Fourth, during the evidentiary hearing below, Garcia testified that he not only 
discussed the general contours of the plea agreement with Defendant, but also that 
he specifically discussed the crime itself. Specifically, Garcia explained that he had 
"specifically address[ed] the charge of discharging a firearm" with Defendant 
during their discussions. R. 3971 at 227:12. 
Finally, in the plea affidavit itself, Defendant stated that he understood "the 
nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest)." 
R. 3971 at 76. Though Defendant subsequently filed four pro se requests to 
withdraw his plea and one motion through counsel, he never once suggested that he 
did not know about or understand the elements of the crime at issue. 
Given all of this, there is no reason to think that it should have been "obvious 
to the trial court" that Defendant did not understand the elements of this crime. 
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Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. Defendant not only knew the charge at issue, but he also 
knew the specific subvariant. Moreover, he had the opportunity to discuss this plea 
agreement with two different attorneys prior to the plea colloquy, as well as with an 
additional attorney during the plea withdrawal proceedings. In spite of this, 
Defendant never claimed that he did not understand all of the elements of the crime 
to which he pleaded, but instead repeatedly informed the court below that he 
thought that rule 11 had been fully complied with. 
Thus, taken as a whole, this record does not show that Defendant was 
obviously uninformed of this element. If reached, Defendant's claim should 
therefore be rejected.10 
Defendant also suggests that there was an insufficient factual basis to show 
that he had an "intent to intimidate or harass another/7 Pet. Br. 19,25-26. But intent 
can be proven through circumstantial evidence, State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 
(Utah 1992), and it can also be "inferred from the actions of the defendant or from 
surrounding circumstances/' Corwell, 2005 UT 28, \ 43. Moreover, "a person is 
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts/' State v. 
Sisneros, 631, P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1981), 
In his plea affidavit, Defendant admitted that he not only fired shots toward 
the building, but also that he had fired them "toward the direction of people." R. 
3971 at 76. One natural and probable consequence of firing a gun at people is that 
those people will feel intimidated or harassed. Moreover, it is also reasonable to 
infer that when a person intentionally fires a gun toward other people, that person 
at least intended to intimidate or harass them. 
In addition, the statute at issue is also satisfied if Defendant intended "to 
damage a habitable structure." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). In both the plea 
colloquy and the plea affidavit, Defendant admitted that he "intentionally and 
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C Even if there was error, it was harmless. 
Although the court of appeals concluded that there had been obvious error 
below, the court still rejected Defendant's plain error claim because he had not 
shown that the alleged error "actually affected the outcome of the plea process." 
Moa, 2009 UT App 231, f 17. The court of appeals was correct. 
1. To prevail on his claim, Defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty 
but for the error. 
To prevail on a plain error claim, Defendant must also show that the obvious 
error was "harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for the appellant." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. 
In this case, however, Defendant claims that when a trial court fails to ensure 
that a defendant knew the elements of the crime, the resulting "harm is self-
evident." Pet. Br. 35. As a result, Defendant claims that he does not have to "prove 
that he would have refused to enter his plea if he had been informed correctly of the 
elements" to establish prejudice. Pet. Br. 38 (quotations and citation omitted). 
knowingly discharged a firearm toward a building." R. 3971 at 76; 226: 6. One 
natural and probable consequence of discharging a firearm toward a building is that 
the building might be damaged. And when a person intentionally fires a gun at a 
building, it is also reasonable to infer that the person intended to damage the 
building. Defendant therefore has not shown any error, let alone obvious error. 
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But this argument has already been rejected by this Court. In State v. Dean, 
2004 UT 63, f Tf 16-23, 95 P.3d 276, the defendant argued that the trial court had 
plainly erred when it failed to advise him of his constitutional rights before 
accepting his plea. In considering whether any error was harmful, this Court noted 
that in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, a defendant must show that 
there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he [or she] would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at f 22 
(quotations and citation omitted). Thus, a defendant in such cases "must show that 
the alleged error 'affected the outcome of the plea process/" Id. at % 22 (quoting Hill 
v. Locklwrt, 474 U.S. 52,59 (1985)). This Court then adopted that same standard for 
cases in which a defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred during the plea 
colloquy. In such cases, the defendant must show that, "but for the alleged error, 
[the defendant] would not have pled guilty." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). 
In State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App 219, t 13, 189 P.3d 85, the court of 
appeals applied this rule to the very claim at issue in this case. There, Diaz-Arevalo 
claimed that the trial court failed to ensure that he knew all the elements of the 
crime before accepting his plea. Id. After concluding that the trial court had 
committed obvious error, the court of appeals found that the error was harmless. Id. 
at Tf^f 14-15. Relying on Dean, the court of appeals held that when a defendant 
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claims that he was not informed of the elements of the crime, he still must show that 
"but for the alleged error, he or she would not have plead guilty/' Id. at f If 15-16. 
Defendant is therefore incorrect when he claims that he does not have to show 
individualized harm in this case. Instead, he can only prevail if he shows that the 
alleged error actually affected this plea process — i.e. that he would not have entered 
his plea but for the alleged error.11 
2. Defendant has not shown harm in this case. 
Turning to the facts of this case, Defendant claims that there is a "reasonable 
probability" that he would not have accepted this plea if he had "been informed of 
all the elements of the offense/' Pet. Br. 39. The record belies that assertion. 
Defendant was initially charged with three counts of aggravated assault. R. 
3971 at 1-3. The State also alleged that each of these counts was subject to the gang 
enhancement. R. 3971 at 1-3. If convicted, Defendant was facing prison sentences of 
5-to-life on each count. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1(3)(d). In spite of this, Defendant's attorney was able to secure a plea 
agreement in which Defendant could plead no contest to a third degree felony and 
11
 InLovell, 2010 UT 48, f ! 48-80, this Court held that harmless error review is 
not applicable to rule 11 violations under the pre-2005 version of rule 11. As noted 
above, however, this plea was taken after 2005. Thus, Lovell does not impact the 
harmless error analysis in this case. 
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be released from jail immediately without serving any time in prison. R. 3971 at 227: 
4, 12. In assessing Defendant's claim of prejudice, the practical benefits that 
Defendant received from the deal are significant.. In Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 
1066, 1075 (10th Cir. 2001), for example, the Tenth Circuit rejected a claim like 
Defendant's, concluding that the defendant's decision to accept the "plea was based 
on his belief that he would likely receive a more lenient sentence" under the deal 
"than if he were to proceed to trial." Under those circumstances, the court 
"rationally inferred that the precise elements" of the crime at issue "were not 
material to [the defendant] in making his plea." Id. 
This is particularly true here, where the record shows that Defendant's 
motivation for accepting this plea was directly tied to his immediate release from 
jail. During the plea hearing, for example, Defendant asked the court for 
confirmation that "I'll be released today for sure?" R. 3971 at 226:14. And during 
the subsequent evidentiary hearing, Manny Garcia explained that Defendant had 
only agreed to the amended deal because he "wanted to get out of jail that day." R. 
3971 at 227:12; see also R. 3971 at 227:13 ("He wanted to get out of jail that day and 
so I went back and talked to Vince about what deal could we make so that he could 
get out that day."). According to Garcia, Defendant was going to accept the original 
deal "until he realized he wasn't going to get out that day and then that's when the 
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deal changed/7 R. 3971 at 227:17. Thus, "the only reason [the deal] changed" was 
Defendant's desire to get out of jail that day. R. 3971 at 227:17. And when the State 
agreed to Defendant's immediate release, Defendant got "exactly what he was 
anticipating/' because "his biggest concern . . . was he wanted to get out of jail." 
R. 3971 at 234:17-18. 
In spite of this, and in spite of the fact that he never raised this claim below, 
Defendant now insists that he would not have taken this lenient deal if he had only 
known that he was admitting to having tried to intimidate somebody. Pet. Br. 39. 
The record simply does not support this claim. Defendant's prior criminal record 
included multiple charges for assault, as well as charges for obstruction of justice, 
robbery, theft, and interfering with arrest. R. 3971 at 112: 6. After fleeing the State 
following his arrest on these very charges, Defendant continued his pattern of 
violent crime. Between his arrest in this case and his return to Utah, he was charged 
with assault in Washington in November 2003, obstruction of justice and vandalism 
in California in May 2005, and assault in Washington in June 2005. R. 3971 at 112:6-
7. And even after being jailed on these charges, Defendant continued to show a 
pronounced proclivity toward violence and aggressive, intimidating behavior. 
While awaiting resolution of these charges, he was charged with 13 different jail 
violations, including fighting, using abusive language to jail staff, inciting other 
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prisoners to disobey orders, using threatening language to other prisoners, 
assaulting jail staff, disorderly conduct, and damage of jail property. R. 3971 at 112: 
4-5. Indeed, even after accepting the terms set forth in this plea, Defendant engaged 
in further acts of violence and intimidation. In case 4352, he drove a car during a 
drive-by shooting in a residential neighborhood, and he then rammed a police car 
during the subsequent high speed chase. R. 4352 at PSI: 3. Thus, Defendant's long-
standing history belies his claim, instead showing that he has no reluctance at all 
toward intimidation, aggression, and violence. 
Defendant raises a number of arguments in preemptive response, all of which 
are unavailing. First, Defendant points out that he asked the plea court whether he 
could get a trial, and he then argues that this shows that he would not have pleaded 
guilty had he known of the missing element. Pet. Br. 39. This assumes too much. 
Although given the opportunity to do so at the plea hearing, Defendant did not ask 
any questions about the elements of the crime. R. 3971 at 226:11. And even after 
being informed that he could receive a trial if he rejected the plea agreement, he still 
chose to accept it. Thus, while the record shows some concern over other aspects of 
this plea, it shows no concern over the elements of the crime at the time f o this plea. 
This is significant. In State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 422 (Utah 1998), for example, 
this Court held that a plea was knowing and voluntary even though the defendant 
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had "exhibited moments of confusion during the plea-taking" and asked a series of 
questions prior to entering his plea. No different result is required here. 
Second, Defendant points to the fact that he filed a motion to withdraw his 
plea. Pet. Br. 39. But while the record shows that Defendant was concerned about 
his plea following the hearing, the record does not show that his concern had 
anything to do with the elements of the crime. Defendant never mentioned the 
elements in any of his four pro se letters, the motion to withdraw that he filed 
through counsel, or in the evidentiary hearing itself. R. 3971 at 101-09. Instead, he 
only complained about the witness tampering charge (which was subsequently 
dropped), as well as the alterations to the plea agreement. R. 3971 at 101-06. 
Finally, Defendant argues that because he expressed concern about this same 
intent element when it arose in case 4352, this demonstrates that he would not have 
accepted the plea in case 3971 if he had been properly informed of it. Pet. Br. 40. 
But this argument also assumes too much. 
In case 4352, Defendant was similarly charged with unlawful discharge of a 
firearm. R. 4352 at 2-6. During the plea hearing in that case, Defendant admitted 
that he was driving the car with a friend and that he "made a U-turn to shoot in 
there." R. 4352 at 121: 9. Upon further questioning, however, Defendant denied 
that the reason he had driven "over there with the guy with the gun was to 
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intimidate somebody." R. 4352 at 121: 10. Defendant explained: "It wasn't to 
intimidate. It was just discharge the firearm." R. 4352 at 121:11. When the trial 
court then informed Defendant that it would "infer intimidation from that" and still 
accept Defendant's plea, Defendant did not object. R. 4352 at 121:11. Instead, he 
still agreed to plead guilty, R. 4352 at 121:11-12, and he has not raised that issue in 
his appeal of that case. 
Thus, what the record from case 4352 actually shows is that even when 
Defendant was expressly informed of this same element in a different case, and even 
when Defendant did express some concern about that element in that case, his 
concern over that element was not strong enough to cause him to reject the State's 
plea agreement and instead proceed to trial. 
In short, the plea agreement in case 3971 allowed Defendant to avoid three 
potential life sentences and instead be immediately released from jail. Although 
Defendant now claims that he would have rejected this offer rather than ever 
admitting that he tried to intimidate someone, his life history belies that claim. 
Defendant is a known gang leader whose history of violence and intimidation both 
pre-dates and post-dates this plea. Moreover, the record shows that Defendant did 
not accept this deal because of a principled belief about which elements best fit his 
crime. Rather, Defendant accepted this deal because it allowed him to receive 
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exactly what he wanted: immediate release from jail. Having already received that 
benefit, he should not be allowed to retroactively void the deal based on an alleged 
error that had nothing to do with his decision to accept the deal in the first 
instance — particularly where he repeatedly waived any claim regarding this exact 
error during the proceedings below. 
Defendant's plain error claim should be rejected. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT ORDERED DEFENDANT'S SENTENCES IN CASE 4352 TO 
RUN CONSECUTIVELY. 
A trial court's decision to order consecutive or concurrent sentences is 
governed by Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401 (West 2004). Under § 76-3-401(2), a 
court is required to "consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the 
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant" when making that decision. 
In case 4352, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion when it ordered consecutive sentences. Moa, 2009 UT App 231, f 20. 
Defendant challenges that conclusion on two bases. First, he argues that the trial 
court based its decision on two allegedly improper comments from the prosecutor at 
sentencing. Pet. Br. 47-50. Second, Defendant argues that it was an abuse of 
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discretion to order consecutive sentences under State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 
1998). Pet. Br. 45-47. Both claims should be rejected. 
A- The record does not support Defendant's claim that the trial court 
considered improper statements at sentencing. 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by basing its 
sentencing decision on two allegedly improper comments from the prosecutor. Pet. 
Br. 47-50. In the first, the prosecutor stated that the "whole neighborhood" was the 
victim of the drive-by shooting. R. 4352 at 122: 6. In the second, the prosecutor 
referred to the fact that there had been a prior shooting at this same home earlier in 
the year. R. 4352 at 122: 5. 
As an initial matter, Defendant is incorrect when he claims that § 76-3-401's 
reference to "the number of victims" could not include consideration of harm done 
to the surrounding neighbors. Pet. Br. 47. It is well accepted that trial courts are 
allowed to consider the injury that has been caused to "society" as part of a 
sentencing decision See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 947 R2d 630, 644 (Utah 1997). And 
this rule has been specifically extended to the decision whether to order consecutive 
or concurrent sentences. See State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454,458 (Utah App. 1993). 
Studies have shown that violent crimes such as this one can directly impact 
the surrounding community in a number of ways. For example, violent crime 
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drives down the property values in the surrounding neighborhood. See John R. 
Hipp, et. al., Drive-bys and Trade-ups: Examining the Directionality of the Crime and 
Residential Instability Relationship, 87(4) Social Forces 1782 (June 2009). And it also 
increases the rates of juvenile delinquency and mental health disorders amongst 
adolescents who live in the neighborhood. See generally Deborah Burdett Schiavone, 
The Effects of Exposure to Community Violence on Aspects of Adolescent Identity 
Development, 22 Journal of Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Nursing 99 (May 2009); 
Sarah Kelly, The Psychological Consequences to Adolescents of Exposure to Gang Violence 
in tlie Community: An Integrated Review of the Literature, 23 Journal of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatric Nursing 67, 69 (May 2010). 
Nor was it inappropriate for the prosecutor to point out that these victims 
had already been victimized by a prior shooting. As noted, § 76-3-401(2) allows a 
court to consider "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses'' as part of its 
consecutive/concurrent decision. Among others, the particular harm suffered by 
these victims would certainly increase the "gravity" of this particular offense. 
But more importantly, the court of appeals ultimately rejected Defendant's 
claim on this issue because it concluded that Defendant had failed to show that 
either comment actually influenced the trial court's sentencing decision. Moa, 2009 
UT App 231, f 20. This conclusion was correct. 
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It is well-accepted that a defendant bears the burden of establishing error 
when he claims that the trial court improperly weighed the § 76-3-401(2) factors. 
State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, Iff 11,16,40 P.3d 626; State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 
432, f 28,82 P.3d 1167. Contrary to Defendant's suggestion, this burden is not met 
when a defendant simply shows that the trial court was silent regarding a particular 
factor. This Court has instead held that a trial court is not required to state on the 
record "the extent to which it considered" each of the factors set forth in § 76-3-402. 
Helms, 2002 UT 12, If110-11; accord State v. Valdez, 2008 UT App 329, f 8,194 P.3d 
195. Instead, sentences are affirmed as long as information regarding the contested 
factor was properly before the trial court. Helms, 2002 UT 12, Iff 10-16; State v. 
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah App. 1997). Thus, if the record shows that the 
factor was discussed in the PSI and that the trial court reviewed the PSI prior to 
sentencing, that is sufficient to show that the trial court properly considered the 
factor. See Helms, 2002 UT 12,113; Valdez, 2008 UT App 329,1 8. 
Defendant cites to no statute or case that requires a trial court to specifically 
delineate and then ''reject77 all testimony or "arguments77 that it found to be 
"inappropriate for consideration77 in the consecutive/concurrent analysis. Pet. Br. 
50. This failure is particularly important here, where Defendant did not even object 
to the statements that he now finds to be so objectionable. R. 4352 at 122: 5-6. As 
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explained by the Massachusetts Court of Appeals, the "failure of defense counsel to 
object to statements made by a prosecutor during the closing is a matter to which we 
attach significance/7 Commonwealth v. Leach, 901 N.E.2d 708,717 (Mass. App. 2009) 
(quotations and citation omitted). "It is not only a sign that what was said sounded 
less exciting at trial than appellate counsel now would have it seem, but it is also 
some indication that the tone and manner of the now challenged aspect of the 
prosecutor's argument were not unfairly prejudicial/7 Id. 
Thus, while the trial court clearly heard the comments at issue, the court 
never referred to them during the sentencing hearing. See generally R, 4352 at 122:1-
7. Instead, the court stated that its sentencing decision was only based on its 
conclusion that Defendant is an "extreme danger to any community that he happens 
to be in.77 R. 4352 at 122: 6. Defendant's claim that these two comments had 
anything to do with this decision is therefore unsupported by the record. 
B. It was not an abuse of discretion to order consecutive sentences. 
Defendant also claims that under the broader facts of this case, the decision to 
order consecutive sentences was an abuse of discretion. But this Court has long 
held that trial courts retain discretion over this decision. See Helms, 2002 UT12, 18. 
In such cases, a trial court only abuses its discretion when "no reasonable [person] 
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would take the view adopted by the trial court/' State v. Russell, 791 R2d 188,192 
(Utah 1990); see also State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, If 12, 84 P.3d 854. 
Here, the trial court offered only one explanation for its decision to order 
consecutive decisions: that Defendant is "an extreme danger to any community that 
he happens to be in," R. 4352 at 122: 6.12 
The record amply supported this conclusion. In case 4352, Defendant 
admitted that he was the driver during a drive-by shooting. R. 4352 at 121: 9. 
Following the shooting, Defendant led officers on a high speed chase that reached 
125 to 130 mph. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. During that chase, Defendant intentionally 
rammed his car into a police car, and he was only stopped after officers performed 
the pit maneuver on him. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. Defendant then ran away, and officers 
had to taser him twice in order to subdue him. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. 
While this crime alone showed that Defendant is an "extreme danger to any 
community that he happens to be in," Defendant's criminal history amplified that 
conclusion. R. 4352 at 122: 6. As set forth in the PSI, Defendant has been involved in 
17 criminal incidents since 1997. R. 4352 at PSI: 6-7. In fact, his criminal history in 
12
 Though not raised as an issue on appeal, the State notes that this was 
apparently a reference to Defendant's character, history, and rehabilitative potential, 
all of which are appropriate factors for consideration under § 76-3-401(2). 
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Utah is serious enough that he was at one time officially listed as Public Enemy 
Number One. R. 4352 at PSI: 6. In addition, Defendant was a fugitive from charges 
in Washington state at the time of these incidents. R. 4352 at PSI: 6 
Defendant's criminal proclivities have never been curbed by the threat of 
incarceration. Defendant's involvement in this case occurred while awaiting 
sentencing in case 3971. Once in jail, Defendant was repeatedly charged with 
infractions. While awaiting resolution of case 3971, he was charged with fighting, 
using abusive language to jail staff, inciting other prisoners to disobey orders, using 
threatening language to other prisoners, assaulting jail staff, disorderly conduct, and 
damage of jail property. R. 3971 at 112:4-5. And Defendant was charged with two 
more rule violations while in jail awaiting resolution of case 4352, including 
disorderly conduct and not following orders from jail staff. R. 4352 at PSI: 5. 
Contrary to Defendant's claim, Galli does not mandate a different result. See 
generally Pet. Br. 45-47. In Galli, this Court reversed two trial courts' imposition of 
consecutive sentences because the courts had failed to "give[ ] adequate weight to 
certain mitigating circumstances." Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. But Galli did not establish 
a baseline rule that mandates reversal whenever the facts of a particular case 
somehow seem less egregious. Rather, the statute itself makes it clear that the 
decision whether to order consecutive or concurrent sentences is a case-specific one 
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that turns on the particular facts of a particular case. Subsequent decisions have 
accordingly limited Galli to its own facts. See, e.g., State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f 67,52 
P.3d 1210; Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 15; Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, If 24 n.7; State v. 
Pierson, 2000 UT App 274, f 23,12 P.3d 103. 
In any event, Defendant's comparison to Galli fails on its own terms. For 
example, Defendant suggests that, "as in Galli, [his] case did not involve physical 
harm or death to the victims/' Pet. Br. 46. But in Galli, the lack of harm was 
intentional — Galli had only carried a pellet gun during his robberies, and he never 
fired it during his crimes. See Galli, 967 P.2d at 932. Defendant, however, fired an 
actual handgun at the crowd of people in case 3971, R. 3971 at 75-76, and his 
companion also fired an actual gun at a home during the drive-by shooting at issue 
in case 4352. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. Following that shooting, Defendant led officers on 
a high speed chase, after which Defendant rammed a police car in an effort to get 
away. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. Any of these intentional actions could have resulted in 
injury or death to any number of bystanders. The fact that no one was killed was 
the result of happenstance, not a deliberate choice by Defendant. 
Defendant also suggests that, like Galli, his pleas show a willingness to accept 
responsibility for his crimes. Pet. Br. 46. The record refutes this claim as well. After 
entering his plea in case 3971, Defendant told the PSI investigator that he "was not 
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there/7 "did not do this crime/' and thus had "no story to tell other than that/7 R. 
3971 at 112: 3. Defendant was also "elusive77 and "uncooperative77 during the 
preparation of the PSI in that case; among others, he "appeared to lie about his 
involvement in gangs, the current offense, his parole status, and his pending cases/7 
R. 3971 at 112: 4. Defendant similarly failed to accept responsibility when 
interviewed for the PSI in case 4352. There, he did not directly admit that he drove a 
car in a drive-by shooting; rather, he appeared to minimize his conduct, stating that 
he "got into a car that a firearm was discharged from.77 R. 112: 4. And rather than 
acknowledging that he rammed a police car during a high speed chase, he 
suggested that he and the officer had simply lost control of their vehicles and 
simultaneously "ran into the curb.77 R. 4352 at PSI: 4.13 
The record also shows that Defendant's guilty pleas in both cases were not 
selfless attempts at a full confession, but were instead negotiated deals that allowed 
Defendant to avoid liability for extensive criminal conduct. In case 3971, initial 
charges involving three first degree felonies (through the gang enhancement) were 
reduced to a no contest plea to a third degree felony. And in case 4352, initial 
13
 The damage done to the two cars supports the officer's claim that this was 
an intentional collision. Specifically, the rental car that Defendant was driving was 
"totaled," and the police vehicles sustained $8,730 in damages. R. 4352 at PSI: 6. 
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charges of nine separate third degree felonies and a class A misdemeanor were 
reduced to guilty pleas to three third degree felonies. R. 4352 at 2-5, 73-74. 
Finally, Defendant suggests that he is more amenable to leniency than Galli 
because, unlike Galli, he "did not abscond for three years before sentencing." Pet. 
Br. 46. With respect to this factor, the differences between Defendant and Galli 
could not be more profound. After Galli fled from Utah, he moved to Minnesota, 
during which time he "apparently obeyed the law, helped his neighbors, and was a 
productive individual." Galli, 867 P.2d at 938. When Defendant fled Utah in case 
3971, however, he continued living a life of violent crime, incurring multiple assault 
charges in Washington, as well as charges of obstruction of justice, drug dealing, 
and vandalism in California. R. 3971 at 112: 6-7. And even with the threat of 3-to-5 
years in prison hanging over his head in case 3971, Defendant did not stop 
committing violent crime, as evidenced by his conduct in case 4352, as well as his 
subsequent series of violent jailhouse incidents. 
In short, Defendant is not an "immature young man who was afraid of being 
caught." Pet. Br. 46. Rather, Defendant is a repeat offender with a long history of 
violent crime. Given the violent nature of this offense, as well as Defendant's 
extensive criminal history prior to and after this offense, the trial court was well 
within its discretion when it ordered consecutive sentences. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted September 2% , 2010. 
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GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
fl This appeal encompasses two consolidated cases stemming from 
separate drive-by shootings. In case no. 031903971 (case #3971), 
Charles Moa was charged with three counts of aggravated assault. 
Moa entered a no-contest plea to one count of discharging a 
firearm toward a building but subsequently moved to withdraw his 
plea. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Moa to a 
prison term of three to five years. Moa appeals the trial 
court's denial of his motion, alleging violations of both rule 11 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and constitutional 
requirements, and essentially arguing that his plea was not 
entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was not informed of 
the nature and elements of the crime to which he pled. 
\2 In case no. 071904352 (case #4352), Moa was charged with 
seven counts of discharging a firearm toward a building, one 
count of failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, one 
count of aggravated assault, and one count of failure to stop. 
Moa pleaded guilty to one count of discharging a firearm from a 
vehicle, failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, and 
aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Moa to three to 
five years on the discharge of a firearm charge, zero to five 
years on the failure to respond to an officer's signal charge, 
and zero to five years on the aggravated assault charge. All of 
the sentences from this case and case #3 971 were to run 
consecutively. Moa appeals the trial court's imposition of 
consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences. We affirm in 
both cases. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
%3 Moa raises two issues, one pertaining to each case. First, 
he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in case 
#3 971 by denying his motion to withdraw his no-contest plea. "We 
review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Holland, 
921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
However, "[w]hether the trial court strictly complied with rule 
11 is a question of law, reviewed for correctness.... The 
trial court's underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear 
error." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^ 9, 22 P.3d 1242 (citation 
omitted). Moa concedes that this issue was not preserved and 
asks us to consider it under either the plain error doctrine or 
the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine. Under the plain 
error doctrine, we reverse where the defendant "establish[es] 
that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 15, 95 
P.3d 276 (internal quotation marks omitted). Alternatively, we 
review an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as a matter of 
law. See State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
In order for a defendant's Sixth Amendment 
challenge to succeed, the defendant "must 
show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. This requires showing that 
counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable." 
Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)), 
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f4 Second, Moa argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion in case #4352 by imposing consecutive rather than 
concurrent sentences. "We afford the trial court wide latitude 
in sentencing and, generally, will reverse a trial court's 
sentencing decision only if it is an abuse of the judge's 
discretion." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, % 66, 52 P.3d 1210 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Withdrawal of No-Contest Plea 
f5 We first consider whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Moa's motion to withdraw his no-contest 
plea in case #3971. 
f6 On April 4, 2003, Moa and two other individuals allegedly 
discharged firearms toward three people in a business parking 
lot. Moa was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, a 
second degree felony. Moa was appointed an attorney, who 
withdrew because of a conflict and new counsel was appointed. On 
the day of his preliminary hearing, Moa alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel and moved to have yet another attorney 
appointed. The trial court granted the motion, continued the 
hearing, and appointed James Valdez. Weeks later, Valdez also 
requested permission to withdraw on the basis of a conflict and 
moved to continue the preliminary hearing. The trial court 
granted this motion and appointed Manny Garcia. While 
represented by Garcia, Moa entered a no-contest guilty plea to 
one count of discharging a firearm toward a building, a third 
degree felony. 
i[7 At the plea hearing, the State clarified the written plea 
agreement, stating that it would dismiss the three aggravated 
assault charges, that Moa would be released that day, and that it 
would recommend probation unless Moa failed to obtain a 
presentence report: or committed any further crimes prior to 
sentencing. The trial court made a few changes to the 
information by interlineation and the State agreed to submit an 
amended information reflecting the new charge, which it did two 
and a half weeks later. 
1(8 During the plea colloquy, the attorneys, trial court, and 
Moa discussed Moa's charges. When asked for the factual 
predicate for the charge, defense counsel stated "Judge, 
apparently on or about the 4th of April 2003 Mr. Moa, as a party, 
intentionally and knowingly discharged a firearm coward a 
building in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. That's what is 
written down here as the element and the facts, Your Honor." 
Although neither counsel readily recalled the code section under 
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which Moa was being charged, the plea affidavit states: "76-10-
508 On or about 4/4/2003 defendant as a party intentionally and 
knowingly discharged a firearm from a vehicle toward [building] 
m [Salt Lake] County State of Utah." (strikeout in original). 
f9 The trial court repeatedly asked Moa if he understood the 
charges and the procedure. Mca indicated that he did. Also, 
defense counsel Garcia explained that prior counsel Valdez "had 
already arranged this and I just reiterated it all and have gone 
over it again with [Moa] and I believe that this is our 
understanding of the deal." Moa agreed. 
flO At the time Moa allegedly committed the crime, Utah Code 
section 76-10-508 provided that it was a class B misdemeanor for 
a person to "discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or firearm 
. . . within 600 feet of . . . a house, dwelling, or any other 
building." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (1) (a) (vn) (A) , (2) (2003) 
(amended 2008), Section 76-10-508 further provided that it was a 
third degree felony with a minimum sentence of three years if the 
actor discharged the firearm "with intent to intimidate or harass 
another," Id. § 76-10-508(2)(b) (emphasis added).2 The trial 
court mistakenly informed Moa that a third degree felony was 
punishable by zero to five years in the state prison, but the 
attorneys corrected the court, and the court then correctly told 
Moa that the offense was punishable by three to five years. 
Neither the colloquy nor the plea affidavit referred to a 
specific subsection of 76-10-508. Likewise, they did not include 
subsection (2)(b)'s language, "with intent to intimidate or 
harass another." The trial court also told Moa that if he were 
convicted of the three original second-degree felony charges of 
aggravated assault, and the sentences were ordered to run 
consecutively, he "could be looking at 45 years." The trial 
court accepted Moa's no-contest plea, ordered a pre-sentence 
investigation (PSI) report, and ordered Moa released to Pretrial 
Services. 
Ill On May 31, 2007, the State moved to revoke Moa's pretrial 
release because Moa did nou report to Pretrial Services. On Jane 
9, 2007, the events leading to case #4352 occurred. 
1|12 On June 15 and 22, 2007, Moa filed pro se motions to 
withdraw his no-contest plea based on different issues than those 
now raised on appeal. Subsequently, Garcia moved to withdraw and 
was replaced with Moa's fifth attorney, Robin Lgungberg. At the 
1. Section 76-10-508 was amended in 2 0 08. The quoted language 
is now found in Utah Code section 76-10-508.1, winch outlines tne 
penalties for a felony discharge of a firearm. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-508.1 (2008). 
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hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Moa stipulated 
there was full compliance with the provisions of rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. At that hearing, Garcia 
testified that Valdez had prepared the plea affidavit and 
described why the changes were made. The trial court denied 
Moa's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court's 
written Findings of Fact included: 
1. The parties stipulated that the plea 
taken on May 25, 2007 was taken in compliance 
with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
3. The court finds Mr. Garcia to be a 
credible witness. 
4. The court finds that based on Mr. Moa's 
physical demeanor and his responsiveness to 
questions, Mr. Moa was aware of what was 
happening during the proceedings. 
5. The [c]ourt finds that all involved 
parties took measures to ensure that Mr. Moa 
understood what was occurring, especially in 
light of the numerous changes in attorneys 
that Mr. Moa had on this case. 
The trial court concluded that "[t]he defendant's plea was 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made." 
1|13 Moa now appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to 
withdraw his no-contest plea, asserting that the trial court 
violated rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure by 
failing to ensure that Moa understood all the elements of the 
crime, specifically the penalty-enhancing element of "intent to 
intimidate or harass another." Rule 11 describes necessary 
findings a trial court must make prior to accepting a guilty 
plea. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11. Included in rule 11 are the 
requirements that the court find that (1) "the defendant 
understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered" and (2) "there is a factual basis for the plea." 
Id. R. 11(e)(4)(A)-(B). However, strict compliance with rule 11 
is not constitutionally required. See Salazar v. Warden, 852 
P.2d 988, 991-92 (Utah 1993) (discussing strict compliance and 
concluding "a failure to comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a 
guilty plea does not in itself amount to a violation of a 
defendant's rights under either the Utah or the United States 
Constitution").2 " [T]he substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure 
2, Although Salazar involved a post-conviction challenge, its 
holding appears to have equal application in a direct appeal of 
(continued...) 
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that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the 
basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty. That goal 
should not be overshadowed or undermined by formalistic ritual." 
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^ 11, 22 P.3d 1242. "[A] 
[defendant] must show more than a violation of the prophylactic 
provisions of rule 11; he or she must show that the guilty plea 
was in fact not knowing and voluntary." Salazar, 852 P.2d at 
992; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). 
fl4 We thus review Moa's no-contest plea to determine whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Moa's 
plea was knowing and voluntary. In order for a plea to be "truly 
voluntary," "the trial court must determine that the defendant 
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts." 
State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1996) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). "[A] court considering such a claim is 
not limited to the record of the plea hearing but may look at the 
surrounding facts and circumstances, including the information 
the [defendant] received from his or her attorneys before 
entering the plea." Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992; see also Visser, 
2000 UT 88, f 13 (concluding that the record reflected that rule 
11 requirements were fulfilled). Furthermore, because we 
consider Moa's appeal under the plain error standard, we must 
determine whether "(1) an error exists; (2) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (3) the error is harmful." 
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, % 15, 95 P.3d 276. 
|^15 We agree with Moa that an error occurred because of an 
internal inconsistency in both the colloquy and the plea 
affidavit. The full elements of the third-degree felony to which 
Moa was pleading were not referenced or clarified anywhere in the 
colloquy or plea statement. Furthermore, the elements and 
factual basis in the plea affidavit and the colloquy were those 
of a class B misdemeanor, not a felony. Moa's statement that his 
counsel had told him about the elements of the crime does not 
obviate this error because there is no evidence that these 
discussions included the intent to intimidate or harass another. 
Further, the error should have been obvious to both the court and 
counsel because the statute was unambiguous. 
fl6 The question of whether the error was harmful is more 
difficult. Under plain error analysis, if obvious and plain 
error is established, a defendant must demonstrate that the error 
was "of such a magnitude that there is a reasonable likelihood of 
2. ( . . .continued) 
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea. See 
In re K.M., 2007 UT 93, ^ 22-23, 173 P.3d 1279; State v. 
Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, % 21 n.9. 
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a more favorable outcome for the defendant." Id. f 22 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). To wit, a defendant must show "that 
'but for' the alleged error, he or she would not have pled 
guilty." Id. In reviewing Moa's motion to withdraw, we 
"consider the facts and circumstances in which the plea was 
taken." Id. f 12; see also Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 13 (involving a 
mid-trial plea). While it is true that the elements of the crime 
were erroneously stated, both the plea colloquy and plea 
affidavit support the conclusion that Moa clearly knew his plea 
was to a felony and also knew the potential sentence was three to 
five years. Moa admitted to firing a gun at a building 
intentionally and knowingly, though he never admitted to an 
intention to harass or intimidate. Further, Garcia had 
approached the prosecution and negotiated an agreement that the 
underlying sentence would be changed from zero-to-five years to 
three-to-five years, and Moa would agree to a PSI before 
sentencing in exchange for the State's agreement that Moa could 
be released that day and that it would not file any "related 
charges." Moa was particularly anxious that he did not have to 
be incarcerated and would be released immediately. Garcia 
discussed these changes with Moa and Moa agreed to them. 
%11 We recognize that a defendant's understanding and knowledge 
of the elements of the crime to which he is pleading no contest 
is an important part of the process. Nevertheless, we conclude 
that Moa has not established that he would have refused to enter 
his plea if he had been informed correctly of the elements and 
thus has not shown that the error "actually affected the outcome 
of the plea process," Dean, 2004 UT 63, *h 23 (internal quotation 
marks omitted), which is the essence of his burden when 
proceeding on a theory of plain error.3 Therefore, Moa is not 
entitled to relief under the plain error doctrine.4 
3. We recently released our opinion in State v. Alexander, 2009 
UT App 188, which also addresses the trial court's failure to 
apprise a defendant of the elements of his claim. See id. ^ 1. 
That case is distinguishable because Alexander's claim was not 
advanced under the plain error doctrine. Here, Moa must 
establish that the trial court's error was not harmless. 
Alexander, on the other hand, simply had to demonstrate that the 
plea was not knowing and voluntary. See id. 1f 14. 
4. Given our disposition on this issue, we need not address 
Moa's ineffective assistance of counsel argument because it also 
requires a showing of prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
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II. Consecutive Rather Than Concurrent Sentences 
1(18 Next, Moa argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by ordering the sentences in case #4352 and case #3971 to run 
consecutively. In determining whether sentences should run 
consecutively or concurrently, "the court shall consider the 
gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2008). We review the 
trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, which "results 
when the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors or 
if the sentence imposed is clearly excessive." State v. McCovey, 
803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (footnotes and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
fl9 Moa argues that the trial court's decision to impose 
consecutive sentences was an abuse of discretion. Specifically, 
Moa challenges two statements made by the prosecutor during the 
sentencing hearing, arguing that the trial court may have relied 
on those statements. First, Moa complains that the trial court 
improperly relied on the prosecutor's statement that the "whole 
neighborhood" was a victim of the offenses. Moa also complains 
that the prosecutor referenced earlier incidents for which Moa 
was not charged. Specifically, during the sentencing hearing, 
the prosecutor stated: 
[T]here was a murder in front of that home in 
February. One of the bullets went into the 
. . . home and hit a young girl in the 
head. . . . It didn't kill her, luckily. 
[Moa] gets released from custody. Within two 
days, there's a shooting again at this home. 
Neighbors come out, there's some witnesses, 
not enough to put together a case but police 
are looking for [Moa]. And then in a few 
more days, there's another shooting. 
Moa asserts that the trial court erred in considering these 
statements because it failed to limit its consideration to the 
actual number of victims and there is no indication in the record 
that he was charged with or convicted of the incidents described. 
[^20 Moa's argument fails because the record does not support his 
claim that the trial court actually relied on either of the 
prosecutor's statements. " [T]he burden is on [the defendant] to 
show that the trial court did not properly consider all the 
factors in section 76-3-401(4)." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, 
U 16, 40 P.3d 626. Moa has not shown that the trial court 
actually relied on these statements; indeed, the trial court said 
little about which statutory factors it was considering, and it 
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is not required to. See State v. Valdez, 2008 UT App 329, ^ 8, 
194 P.3d 195 (stating trial court need not state to what extent 
it considered each of the statutory factors at the sentencing 
hearing). The trial court said only that it considered Moa "an 
extreme danger to any community that he happens to be in." Moa 
speculates that this statement is connected to the prosecutor's 
statements, but in fact, the record does not support this 
speculation. To the contrary, the record supports the trial 
court's assessment, and the trial court acted within its 
discretion by weighing each individual factor as it chose. See 
State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) ("One factor in 
mitigation or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on 
the opposite [side of the] scale."). Again, Moa has not 
presented evidence that would indicate that the trial court 
abused its discretion in weighing the given factors. 
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in ordering Moa's sentences to run consecutively 
rather than concurrently. 
CONCLUSION 
f21 We conclude that Moa has not demonstrated any prejudicial 
plain error regarding the trial court's acceptance of Moa's no-
contest plea: Moa has demonstrated that there was error in the 
taking of his no-contest plea, and that the error was obvious, 
but he has failed to show that the error was harmful. Thus, Moa 
is not entitled to relief under the plain error doctrine. We 
also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in running Moa's sentences consecutively rather than 
concurrently. We affirm. 
/^C^rUt^OC^ /• 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
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§ 76-3-401 (West 2004) Concurrent or consecutive sentences —Limitations—Definition 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and 
commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any 
other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the 
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later 
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court 
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to 
run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request clari-
fication from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified order 
of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single crimi-
nal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences 
imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection 
(6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6) (a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs 
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed 
prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing 
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to 
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of consecutive 
sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Pa-
role shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that 
consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum sen-
tence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, consti-
tutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the 
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer re-
maining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so 
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commit-
ments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose con-
secutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure 
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated 
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-401; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 7; Laws 1989, c. 181, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 13, 
§ 21; Laws 1995, c. 139, § 1, eff. May 1,1995; Laws 1997, c. 283, § 1, eff. May 5,1997; Laws 
1999, c. 275, § 1, eff. May 3,1999; Laws 2002, c. 129, § 1, eff. July 1, 2002. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2002, c. 129, substantially rewrote this section that formerly provided: 
"(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the court states in the sentence 
that they shall run consecutively. 
"(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later 
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole unless the court 
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
"(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences shall run 
consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of Pardons and Parole has reason to believe 
that the later offense occurred while the person was imprisoned or on parole for the 
earlier offense, the board shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the 
request, the court shall enter an amended order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
"(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose 
consecutive sentences. 
"(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single crim-
inal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
"(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences 
imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection 
(6)(b). 
"(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
"(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
"(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs 
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
"(7) The limitation in Subsection (6) (a) applies if a defendant: 
"(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
"(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed 
prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
"(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing 
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to 
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
"(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6) (a) applies, determining the effect of consecu-
tive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that 
shall consist of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
"(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum sen-
tence is considered to be 30 years; and 
"(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, con-
stitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
"(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the 
other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser sentence shall merge into the 
greater and the greater shall be the term to be served. If the sentences are equal and 
concurrent, they shall merge into one sentence with the most recent conviction consti-
tuting the time to be served. 
"(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so 
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commit-
ments. 
"(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose con-
secutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
"(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure 
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated 
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located." 
§ 76-10-508 (West 2004) Discharge of firearm from a vehicle, near a highway, or in 
direction of any person, building, or vehicle — Penalties 
(l)(a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or firearm: 
(i) from an automobile or other vehicle; 
(ii) from, upon, or across any highway; 
(iii) at any road signs placed upon any highways of the state; 
(iv) at any communications equipment or property of public utilities including facili-
ties, lines, poles, or devices of transmission or distribution; 
(v) at railroad equipment or facilities including any sign or signal; 
(vi) within Utah State Park buildings, designated camp or picnic sites, overlooks, golf 
courses, boat ramps, and developed beaches; or 
(vii) without written permission to discharge the dangerous weapon from the owner or 
person in charge of the property within 600 feet of: 
(A) a house, dwelling, or any other building; or 
(B) any structure in which a domestic animal is kept or fed, including a barn, poultry 
yard, corral, feeding pen, or stockyard. 
(b) It shall be a defense to any charge for violating this section that the person being ac-
cused had actual permission of the owner or person in charge of the property at the time 
in question. 
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B misdemeanor unless the actor 
discharges a firearm under any of the following circumstances not amounting to crimi-
nal homicide or attempted criminal homicide, in which case it is a third degree felony 
and the convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three 
years in prison: 
(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of any person or persons, knowing or 
having reason to believe that any person may be endangered; 
(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a hab-
itable structure as defined in Subsection 76-6-101(2), discharges a firearm in the direction 
of any building; or 
(c) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another, discharges a firearm in the di-
rection of any vehicle. 
(3) This section does not apply to a person: 
(a) who discharges any kind of firearm when that person is in lawful defense of self or 
others; or 
(b) who is performing official duties as provided in Sections 23-20-1.5 and 76-10-523 and 
as otherwise provided by law. 
§ 77-13-6 (West 2004) Withdrawal of plea 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and 
a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in abey-
ance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be an-
nounced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw 
the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsec-
tion (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, 
and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
